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Rules of consent to, and refusal of, use have loomed large for
copyrighted works over the last century. In some cases of product in-
novation, the rules of use do concern copyrighted works, but the fact
that the control is exercised over a copyrighted work is merely a hap-
penstance, a fluke of the nature of the product innovation. So patent
holders over phonographs try to limit which music cylinders can be
played' and film projector manufacturers do the same with movies,2just as A.B. Dick tried to limit the ink that could be used with its
mimeograph machines. These are typically cases of price discrimina-
tion-an effort to charge different users different prices depending on
intensity of use-and the control over the good is just a crude ap-
proach to measuring how much the consumer values the relevant
technology. This type of price discrimination can be socially helpful or
harmful.
In other cases, the limits are more directly strategic, as when re-
cord companies sought to bar play of records on radio. How radio in-
fluences purchasing decisions for recorded media-LPs and 45s, later
8-tracks and cassettes, and now CDs-was and is hotly disputed, but
the record companies have routinely sought to limit how radio sta-
tions could use "records." These limits can be most naturally under-
stood as a form of raising rivals' costs, as a way of making it more ex-
pensive for radio to compete with the record companies. These dis-
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1 See Leeds & Catlin Co v Victor Talking Machine Co, 213 US 301, 312-13 (1909) (de-
scribing a method of producing sound records which was patented by plaintiff); Leeds & Catlin
Co v Victor Talking Machine Co (No 2), 213 US 325, 330-31 (1909) (discussing the importance
of plaintiff's patented method of record-making to the transmission of recorded sound waves).
2 See Motion Picture Patents Co v Universal Film Manufacturing Co, 243 US 502,512-13(1917) (holding that a patentee cannot sell a patented film projector and limit its use to unpat-
ented films that are not part of the patented machine).
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the paper, ink, and other supplies used in conjunction with its mimeograph machines to those
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putes continue today with the emergence of webcasting: "radio" sta-
tions that play music over the internet rather than over-the-air.
In yet other cases, consent to use of copyrighted works need not
be obtained upfront or perhaps even ever, and this shapes product in-
novation importantly. VCR manufacturers didn't need prior consent
from copyright holders to enable home time-shifting. This gave the
VCR a substantial advantage over the competing video innovation,
the videodisc or the laser disc, which relied on prerecorded content.
We know what happened: The VCR producers didn't ask for consent,
were sued, and ultimately prevailed in Sony Corporation of America v
Universal City Studios, Inc,' on a 5-4 vote in the Supreme Court on the
ground that home time-shifting was a fair use, a form of mandatory li-
cense under copyright law-a mandatory consent to use.6 We also see
a related path in cable television, but there, a legislative deal replaced
fair use rights with statutory licenses and royalties.7
We now have reached a new point. The shift from analog to digi-
tal is in full swing and again questions of consent and refusal are at
the forefront. Napster inaugurated digital distribution of copyrighted
music, most of it ripped from CDs. As the CDs in the hands of con-
sumers were not encrypted, Napster was able to enter without the
prior consent of rights holders. Napster was sued and lost" and now
has largely been replaced by entities with names that your kids know
and you don't. In video, the VCR is on the way out-Sony has offi-
cially killed the Betamax'-to be replaced by the DVD, certainly for
prerecorded playback and perhaps for recording, and maybe the digi-
tal video recorder, where analog tape is swapped for the digital hard
disk. Unlike music CDs, where encryption of content has come very
late, DVDs came with content controls from the get-go, and the ques-
tion is whether those schemes can be enforced." Television itself is to
4 See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
Antitrust Bull 423, 431 (2002) (discussing new gatekeeping issues raised by the invention of
internet radio).
5 464 US 417 (1984).
6 See id at 456 (stating that home time-shifting was a substantial noninfringing use of the
Betamax and, thus, protected by the fair use doctrine).
7 See Picker, 47 Antitrust Bull at 450 (cited in note 4).
8 A&M Record.; Inc v Napster, Inc, 239 F3d 1004, 1016-17 (9th Cir 2001) (affirming the
district court's conclusion that Napster use reduces CD sales among college students, thereby
harming the market for plaintiffs copyrighted music).
9 See Jon Healy, Sony Finally Throws the Betamax on Scrapheap, LA Times B3 (Aug 28,
2002) ("Like a grieving widow who finally parts with her late husband's golf clubs, Sony Corp.
has given up on Betamax.").
10 Compare Universal City Studios; Inc v Corley, 273 F3d 429, 434-35 (2d Cir 2001) (up-
holding injunction issued by district court barring defendants from posting on a website com-
puter code that could be used to decrypt DVDs), with DVD Copy ControlAssociation v Bunner,
113 Cal Rptr 2d 338, 351 (App 2001) (overturning on First Amendment grounds a preliminary
injunction forbidding defendant from posting online the code to DeCSS, a program which cir-
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switch from analog waves to digital ls and Os, and the question before
the Federal Communications Commission is how the mechanism of
consent and refusal-denominated here as the "broadcast flag"-
should be built into the technology from the ground up."
With encryption, we are on the verge of a significant step in
copyright: We will actually turn copyrighted works into property.
While we frequently speak of copyright, patents, and trademarks as
"intellectual property," this is a casual, classificatory short-hand that
we think helps us to understand these three distinct bodies of law. But
the term itself is quite misleading, as in some basic way, to date, intel-
lectual property has lacked one of the key characteristics of tangible
property: absent taking by force, use of tangible property requires
prior consent of the owner. This isn't true for intellectual property: I
can sing copyrighted songs in the shower to my heart's content. Intel-
lectual property has been protected by something more akin to the
torts system: a right to sue for the violation -meaning use without
consent of course-of a specified right.
Take just a handful of prominent examples of the propertization
of copyrighted works. Encryption schemes on music CDs may limit
the place and manner in which you can listen to the works on those
CDs. That encryption would come with the CD. Other encryption
schemes may come with your computer. For example, the Windows
Media Player that comes with Windows lets you rip music CDs so that
you can play the songs on your computer without inserting the CD
again, but limits further distribution of those works through licensing
and identification technology.'2 Amazon sells e-books in a number of
formats. Books in Microsoft Reader can't be printed; books in Adobe
Acrobat eBook format may or may not be printable depending on
whether the copyright holder has authorized printing.'3 Some of these
schemes have failed in the marketplace. Circuit City originally was
pushing an alternative version of the DVD known as Divx DVD. You
took home the Divx DVD and could play it during a 48-hour viewing
period. After that, if you wanted to play it again, the player connected
over the internet to get a new authorization and to pay the corre-
sponding fee. In many ways, this was a rental model without the hassle
cumvents DVD encryption), petition for review granted, 117 Cal Rptr 2d 167 (2002).
11 See In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 02-231 at 2 (Aug 9, 2002) ("seek[ing] comment on whether a regulatory copy protection
regime is needed within the limited sphere of digital broadcast television").
12 See Features of Windows Media Rights Manager, online at http://www.microsoft.com/
windows/windowsmedia/wm7/drmlfeatures.asp (visited Dec 2, 2002) (discussing protection fea-
tures).
13 See Amazon e-Books FAQ, online at http://www.amazon.com/e-books (visited Dec 2,
2002).
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of returning the media. It never took off, and Circuit City killed the
format in mid-1999.
Note also that this type of propertization is distinctive for copy-
right. We should not see this for trademarks or patents. The swoosh
that appears on my Nike running shoes is one of the most visible
symbols in the world. If I wanted to start attaching the swoosh to my
papers in a bid for cachet, without advance notice-and it would not
have that-Nike has no way to stop me, and can only sue after-the-
fact seeking damages and an injunction. The swoosh is not locked up;
Nike can use it, but so can I. Trademarks generally don't have the ex-
clusive control that we associate with physical property.
The same is true for patents. The core of the U.S. patents scheme
is public disclosure of the invention in exchange for exclusive use
rights for twenty years. Once I pay my three dollars to download a
patent from www.uspto.gov, I can put it to use immediately. Of course,
that will be patent infringement, subjecting me to after-the-fact suit
for damages and injunction. But again, with our system of public filing
of patents, the patent holder does not have exclusive control over the
content described in the patent. I have as much access to it as she
does. It is only in copyright that we can imagine a rights holder assert-
ing exclusive control through encryption."
The propertization of copyright through encryption means that
the owner of a copyrighted work will be able to control access to the
work through prior consent or refusal. No means no, just as it does for
tangible property. If breaking the encryption scheme to gain access to
a copyrighted work is treated as breaking into my home to steal my
computer-and the controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act
largely embraces this scheme16 - we further vindicate the consent and
refusal choices of the owner of the copyrighted work. Had such a
scheme been in effect in the 1970s, both the VCR and cable TV might
have developed quite differently. Just to get going, both would have
required advance consent from copyright holders, and that might have
been quite difficult to obtain.
This Essay sketches these cases of consent and refusal for the use
of copyrighted works over the roughly 100-year path that has taken us
from the age of Edison to the age of encryption and the propertiza-
tion of copyrighted works. For Edison and his contemporaries, no
14 See Brooke Crothers, Divx DVD backers call it quits, CNET News.com (June 16, 1999),
online at http://news.com.com/ 2 100-1040-227194.html (visited Dec 2,2002) (announcing discon-
tinuation of Divx due to failure to "obtain adequate support from studios and other retailers").
15 This ignores trade secrets obviously, where secrecy and exclusive control are the defin-
ing characteristic of the valuable asset.
16 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998), codi-
fied in relevant part at 17 USC §§ 1201-05 (2000).
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didn't mean no, even if they wanted it to-and they did-and that has
been true for most of the twentieth century. That is changing, and this
Essay then turns briefly to consider the implications of this change.
I. CONTROL OVER THE EQUIPMENT: THE PHONOGRAPH
AND THE FILM PROJECTOR
In the early twentieth century, Victor Talking Machines Co. was
one of the Big Three in the new phonograph industry (the others were
Edison's National Phonograph Company and the Columbia Phono-
graph Company).'7 As is often the case in new industries, competing
technical approaches created some natural separation in the market.
Edison's early work in 1877 on the phonograph used tin foil wrapped
around a metal cylinder, and he eventually relied on wax cylinders
when he sought to commercialize his invention around 1888. Other
producers emphasized discs-flat circles-which, of course we know,
is the dominant format today, as seen in CDs and DVDs.'8
Victor went beyond technical separation to try to ensure that its
players played only Victor records. It did this in part through patent
litigation, successfully arguing that a producer of records that could
be played on the Victrola violated the combination patent repre-
sented by the record and the reproducing stylus matched to the re-
cord. (The Victor record used a spiral line of even depth, while the
approaches by Edison and BelllFainter used a groove of uneven
depth.)'9
Victor also tried to limit play through contract and license. Each
Victrola came with a plate attached to it setting forth a lengthy
17 See Andre Millard, America on Record: A History of Recorded Sound 49-50 (Cam-
bridge 1995) ("[The Big Three] dominated the market with their strong patent position and ex-
tensive manufacturing plant.").
18 In this early standards battle, momentum quickly moved in favor of discs. Columbia
dropped cylinders entirely by 1912, and with U.S. Phonograph Co.'s exit in 1913, Edison's then
phonograph company, Thomas A. Edison, Inc., was left as the last producer of cylinders. Even
Edison seemed to recognize the inevitable, introducing its Diamond Disc Phonograph in 1912.
Edison sold cylinders until 1929. See Oliver Read and Walter L. Welch, From Tin Foil to Stereo:
Evolution of the Phonograph 175 (Howard W. Sams 1959). See also U.S. Library of Congress,
The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, online at http://memory.loc.gov/ammeml
edhtml/edcyldr.html (visited Nov 6, 2002). The success of the disc came from the ease of produc-
tion; the cylinder actually played a superior sound. See id. Even when the market coalesced
around discs, manufacturers achieved some technical separation by using different spindle-and-
hole systems, giving rise to a market in adaptors. See Chuck Miller, Aretino Records: The "Hole"
Story, online at http://members.aol.comlclctrmania/cm-aretino.html (visited Dec 2, 2002) (de-
scribing the various sizes of record center-holes and referencing sources where collectors can
purchase adaptors).
19 See Leeds & Catlin Co v Victor Talking Machine Co, 213 US 301,311-13 (1909) ("[The
combination] is, therefore, a true mechanical device, producing by the cooperation of its con-
stituents the result specified and in the manner specified."); Leeds & Catlin Co v Victor Talking
Machine Co (No 2), 213 US 325,335 (1909) ("The disc is not a mere concomitant to the stylus; it
co-acts with the stylus to produce the result.").
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"License Notice." The License Notice addressed many issues, but it
started by addressing the question of licensed uses:
This machine is manufactured by us under our patents hereinaf-
ter noted, and is licensed for use only for the term of the patent
having the longest term to run, and only with sound records,
sound boxes and needles manufactured by us; and our records
and sound boxes are licensed only for use with our machines.20
It is not crystal clear at whom this was aimed. As the Supreme Court
noted, it was unlikely anyone actually read the full License Notice or
that anyone who read it, understood it.2 The Victor contract stood lit-
tle chance of being enforced against end-users. Victor needed to go af-
ter the middlemen facilitating the violation of the License Notice, and
they did in chasing Leeds & Catlin, but Victor did that in reliance on
patent law, and not through the protections of the License Notice.2
These restrictions might have been more useful in the other new,
turn-of-the-century device-based entertainment medium, namely mo-
tion pictures. The early history of motion pictures is dominated by the
Motion Pictures Patents Co., a patent pool organized as a "subter-
fuge" to control the motion pictures industry.23 Movie projectors li-
censed under its patents came with the following plate attached:
The sale and purchase of this machine gives only the right to use
it solely with moving pictures containing the invention of reis-
sued patent No. 12,192, leased by a licensee of the Motion Pic-
tures Patents Company ......
Here, the end-users were not consumers, as was the case with the
phonograph, but instead were exhibitors of movies-in other words,
for-profit businesses.
Limitations of the sort used by Victor and the Motion Pictures
Patents Co. are probably best explained as attempts at price discrimi-
nation. Here, the idea is that Victor would like to charge more to indi-
viduals who place a higher value on the phonograph. With modern
20 Victor Talking Machine Co v Strauss, 230 F 449, 451 (2d Cir 1916), revd on other
grounds, 243 US 490 (1917).
21 Strauss v Victor Talking Machine Co, 243 US 490, 501 (1917) ("[IFor it must be recog-
nized that not one purchaser in many would read such a notice.").
22 See Aretino Records: The "Hole" Story (cited in note 18) (noting that "Victor
finally succeeded in bankrupting [Leeds & Catlin] through repeated patent-infringement
lawsuits"), quoting "Allan Sutton, a music collector, historian and author (http://
www.mainspringpresscom)."
23 See Floyd L. Vaughan, The United States Patent System 46 (Greenwood 1977) (discuss-
ing how the MPPC's system of "interlocking licenses" helped to "practically eliminaten" compe-
tition).
24 Motion Picture Patents Co v Universal Film Manufacturing Co, 243 US 502, 506-07
(1917).
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technology, it might just do that through direct metering of the
amount of use, say the hours of music played. Play ten hours of music
per month, pay ten dollars per month to Victor for the use of the pho-
nograph, play twenty hours, pay twenty dollars.
Absent the ability to engage in direct metering-and Victor
probably couldn't have done this at a reasonable price-a natural al-
ternative is to try to collect more from those who place a high value
on music through the records themselves. People who like music more
will buy more of it, so the purchase of records themselves might oper-
ate as an indirect way of metering use. The key to this, though, is the
ability to charge more-than-competitive prices for the record, as oth-
erwise this accomplishes little for Victor. Victor can't do that if the re-
cord market is competitive, unless it has a means-legal or techni-
cal-to insist that only Victor records be played on Victor phono-
graphs, hence the limitation. Again, had Victor been able to meter di-
rectly, the price discrimination rationale would have given Victor little
reason to tie Victor phonographs with Victor records.
II. CONTROL OVER COMPETITION: RADIO AND THE VCR
The restrictions used by Victor and the Motion Pictures Patents
Co. appear to be efforts at price discrimination rather than efforts at
controlling more subtle strategic interactions. A second reason to use
restrictions of this sort is more strategic, an effort to alter competi-
tion. Consider radio and the VCR.
A. Radio
The record/radio interaction lends meat to a possible strategic
angle for restrictive legends. Whether radio complements record sales
or is instead a substitute for them remains a hotly-contested question.
Do I buy fewer records when I can listen to music for free -over the
air in the beginning, and over the web today-or is radio free
advertising for record sales? Sheet music sellers faced the same
conundrum when the phonograph emerged and the new phonograph
companies started producing content without the consent of copyright
holders."
The continuing fight over payola -the practice of paying for play
of songs, either directly or indirectly-is precisely about the way in
which radio play influences what listeners hear and buy." The ra-
25 See Read and Welch, From Tin Foil to Stereo at 391-92 (cited in note 18) (noting rising
concern of composers such as John Philip Sousa and Victor Herbert about copyright protection
in the age of the phonograph).
26 For the history, see generally R.H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting,
22 J L & Econ 269 (1979) (discussing reasons for the rise in payola between 1930 and 1960 that
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dio/record intersection is also at the heart of the fight over how much
webcasters should pay when they "broadcast" CDs over the internet."
These issues need not detain us here, but consider instead the
legends used by record manufacturers in the 1930s. Judge Learned
Hand's important 1940 opinion in RCA Manufacturing Co v White-
mann mentions two legends used by RCA, the simple "Not Licensed
for Radio Broadcast," and the more complex "Licensed by Mfr. under
U.S. Pats. 1625705, 1637544, RE. 16588 (& other Pats. Pending) Only
for Non-Commercial Use on Phonographs in Homes. Mfr. & Original
Purchaser Have Agreed This Record Shall Not Be Resold Or Used
for Any Other Purpose. See Detailed Notice on Envelope."29
Whiteman rejected the efforts by record producers to limit
broadcast use by notices affixed to the records themselves.3' These
legends barring radio play are easily understood in strategic terms, as
an effort to raise rivals' costs. Record companies feared that radio
would operate as substitute for records. Radio stations could just use
live performances -and did-of music, dramatic shows such as The
Shadow, and comedy classics such as Fibber McGee and Molly.
Switching from live music to recorded music obviously held the prom-
ise of lowering one key input cost, and records were the natural
source of the music. It is easy to see record owners making an initial
move to limit use by radio companies as a way to reduce music com-
petition and to set themselves up for a subsequent attempt at price
discrimination, by licensing records for specific broadcast use to the
radio networks.
B. The VCR
With color TV reaching a saturation point, a number of compa-
nies were pursing research programs to create the next great con-
sumer video device. Indeed, some companies, such as RCA, were pur-
suing multiple approaches simultaneously. Two paths were seen as
particularly promising: magnetic tape and prerecorded disks-the
video equivalent of the Compact Disc for music. The success of the
culminated in the practice being criminalized by Congress and regulated by the FCC), and for
current disputes, see Anna Wilde Mathews and Jennifer Ordonez, Music Labels Say It Costs Too
Much to Get Songs on Radio, Wall St J B1 (June 10, 2002) (discussing modem methods, less di-
rect than payola, such as the use of independent promoters, employed by record labels to forge
relationships with radio executives).
27 I offer a more detailed discussion of webcasting in Picker, 47 Antitrust Bull at 458-62
(cited in note 4).
28 114 F2d 86 (2d Cir 1940).
29 Id at 87.
30 See id at 89-90 (holding that a conductor's "common-law property" in his performances
ends with the sale of the record, so that radio stations cannot be restrained from broadcasting
the records once purchased).
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VCR and the failure-at least in its first incarnation-of the prere-
corded video CD can be traced in part to the role of consent as to
copyrighted works.
Sony launched a freestanding VCR in the U.S. in February 1976.31
Early purchasers of the VCR looked to it for time-shifting of TV
broadcasts, not play of prerecorded tapes.2 This considerably simpli-
fied the consent and refusal process. VCR manufacturers didn't need
to coordinate with copyright owners to get access to broadcasts. The
manufacturers didn't need to get the owners' consent, but could in-
stead just litigate with them and win or lose.
Not that Sony actually played this through in advance of releas-
ing the VCR. Of course, Sony made the standard lawyerly moves of
its entertainment predecessors. An early Sony VCR, the Sony U-
Matic, came with an attached plate bearing the legend "This video-
tape recorder is not to be used to record copyrighted works." The Be-
tamax itself did not bear such a plate, but the operating instructions
addressed the copyright question: "Television programs, films, video-
tapes and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized re-
cording of such material may be contrary to the provisions of the
United States copyright laws."
Much more to the point is that it appears that Sony hadn't con-
sidered whether there would be a real copyright problem and even
dismissed the likelihood of a lawsuit in the face of direct allegations
of copyright infringement from Sidney Sheinberg, then the president
of MCA/Universal." But the VCR producers didn't have to get con-
sent before the fact to access the broadcasts-more precisely, to allow
their customers to record broadcasts-and didn't. The manufacturers
also didn't need to induce the copyright owners to issue prerecorded
tapes, which would have required the owners to wrestle with the stan-
dard question of how distribution on the new medium might undercut
revenue streams from other media, such as movies, pay TV, cable, and
broadcast TV. In contrast, the VCR's main competition in next-
generation video-the video disc-which played recorded video con-
31 John Nathan, Sony: The Private Life 106 (Houghton Mifflin 1999) ("[T]he stand-alone
deck went on sale in February 1976 for $1,295.").
32 See Universal City Studios, Inc v Sony Corp of America, 480 F Supp 429, 438 (CD Cal
1979) ("According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their machines to record
for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time."), affd in part and revd in part, 659 F2d 963
(9th Cir 1981), revd, 464 US 417 (1984); Michael A. Cusumano, Yiorgos Mylonadis, and Richard
S. Rosenbloom, Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over
Beta, 66 Bus Hist Rev 51, 84-85 (1992) ("Users [of VCRs in the late 1970s and early 1980s] gave
little evidence of interest in prerecorded tapes.").
33 Sony, 480 F Supp at 436.
34 See Nathan, Sony at 106-08 (cited in note 31) (stating that Akio Morita, the Japanese-
born founder of Sony America, believed that Sheinberg's threats were empty because in Japan
people "discussing a business deal ... [are] not about to sue each other.").
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tent, depended precisely on careful coordination of hardware and
content.35
Barely six months after the Betamax was introduced in the U.S.,
Sony was sued for copyright infringement." The lawsuit sought money
damages, as well as an injunction against the Betamax. One of the is-
sues that the case addressed was the question of copyright owner con-
sent to time-shifting. At the Supreme Court, the majority understood
the copyright owners to contend that they had the exclusive right to
distribute VCRs. " This flowed from the view that the copyright own-
ers could insist on advance consent to the taping of their copyrighted
works.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun was sensitive to the design deci-
sions made about the VCR and what the future might hold. The deci-
sion to allow recording, rather than just playback of prerecorded
tapes, was of course the key design choice. That gave the product a
decided advantage over competing playback only systems, such as the
RCA VideoDisc, and of course it was the recording feature that raised
the hackles of the copyright owners. Justice Blackmun also under-
stood that new technology might allow the VCR to permit or bar re-
cording based on a signal sent by the broadcast, and suggests that the
Court should have left open the possibility that Sony would have had
the duty to respect such a signal."
Why did some copyright owners oppose the VCR? One possibil-
ity, of course, is that they didn't oppose it at all, but that they were
simply looking to maximize their bargaining position by ensuring that
their consent was required before programs could be recorded. This is
to give copyright owners a consent right and might have resulted in a
copyright tax system, with royalties on VCR and tape sales. Indeed,
we embraced such a scheme for digital recording devices in the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992."
Putting to one side the holdup value of having to consent to
copying, for copyright holders, the critical question was whether the
VCR was seen as a competitor or as another means of content distri-
bution. This depended largely on how consumers would use the VCR:
35 See Margaret B.W. Graham, RCA and the VideoDisc: The Business of Research 113-14
(Cambridge 1986) (discussing RCA's late-1960s strategy to develop and market videoplayers
and discs through systems innovation).
36 See Nathan, Sony at 108 (cited in note 31) ("On November 11, 1976, Universal and
Disney ... filed a suit in federal court against the Sony Corporation, Sony America, and DDB
for copyright infringement.").
37 See Sony, 464 US at 441 n 21 ("The request for an injunction below indicates that re-
spondents seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband.").
38 See id at 494 ("Sony may be able, for example, to build a VTR that enables broadcast-
ers to scramble the signal of individual programs and 'jam' the unauthorized recording of
them.") (Blackmun dissenting).
39 See Pub L No 102-563, 106 Stat 4237 (1992), codified at 17 USC §§ 1001-10 (2000).
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Playback of self-recorded tapes, mainly from TV, or purchase or rental
of prerecorded tapes? Play of prerecorded tapes made the VCR a
new channel of distribution, one that, with the benefit of hindsight, we
know to have become extraordinarily valuable. But if purchasers had
focused instead on play of recorded programs over TV-and this is
what early VCR purchasers did-the VCR might have altered video
competition in important ways.
Greater consumer control over broadcast TV might have shifted
the mix between consumption of free video (TV) and fee video, such
as movies seen in movie theaters. Suppose that I love soap operas and
would watch them over anything else. However, I work during the day
when they are shown. At night, when I can consume video, the soaps
aren't on, so I go to movies instead. When the VCR was introduced,
fee video was less time-constrained than free video, which you had to
watch when it aired or it was gone, so a VCR used for recording might
have shifted the consumption mix in favor of TV to the detriment of
movie producers.
Another idea raised in Sony, and now in the litigation over the
digital video recorder, was that the ability to skip commercials would
kill free TV entirely. On this line, consumers will stop watching com-
mercials, given the power to do so. Commercials are the way we "pay"
for free TV, so if advertisers know no one is watching the commer-
cials, they won't buy ad time. Free TV dies. Efforts by copyright own-
ers to control home-taping then becomes an effort to protect the fi-
nancing mechanism for free broadcast TV, and a hope to solve the col-
lective action problem consumers might otherwise face (we each want
the other guy to watch the commercials).
III. CONTROL PERFECTED: DIGITAL TV
AND THE BROADCAST FLAG
This Essay has tracked roughly the twentieth century develop-
ment of the devices of mass entertainment: the phonograph and mov-
ies, radio, and the VCR. The glaring omission of course is television. 4
The technical invention of TV occurred amidst the almost prototypi-
40 And cable. On cable entry, early case law favored the copyright owners, but two key
Supreme Court decisions established that cable operators were more like viewers than broad-
casters and therefore did not perform the works that they carried. See Teleprompter Corp v Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 415 US 394, 402-05 (1974) (holding that new functions of
CATV systems did not make those systems significantly more like broadcasters than they were
previously); Fortnightly Corp v United Artists Television, Inc, 392 US 390, 400-01 (1968)
("Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing,
whatever programs they receive."). That regime lasted less than two years, as the Copyright Act
of 1976 reset the rules for so-called secondary transmissions, treating some unauthorized trans-
missions as a copyright infringement but coupling that with a mandatory licensing scheme. See
17 USC §§ 111,501 (2001).
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cal competition between the loner-Philo T. Farnsworth-and the in-
dustrial behemoth-RCA." But "inventing" TV technically was in
some sense the easy part; the hard part was putting together the inte-
grated platform of complements that commercialized the invention:
manufacturing, distribution, and most importantly, content. Here,
RCA was uniquely situated to drive TV forward, notwithstanding
enormous uncertainties, and did so under David Sarnoff's leadership.
As a vertically integrated entity-with R&D, manufacturing, and
most importantly, ownership of the National Broadcasting Co. - RCA
had the power to create black-and-white TV.42
Switching from black-and-white to color was almost as complex.
The move from monochrome to color involved a struggle over stan-
dards-where the FCC, after hemming and hawing, chose a CBS-
backed system, only to reverse course three years later and adopt a
system RCA was pushing. The Korean War prevented manufacture of
color sets, while allowing production of black-and-white sets, and this
created a deeper installed base of TVs. This mattered, as RCA's sys-
tem was backward compatible, meaning that monochrome sets could
receive color broadcasts without an adaptor, while the CBS system
would have required retrofitting with adaptors. The war also gave
RCA the chance to improve its all-electronic system, while CBS's
combined mechanical-electronic system didn't move forward substan-
tially during that time due to inherent limitations in the core me-
chanical technology.
3
We are now in the midst of our second TV standards switch, a
move from the NTSC color standard set in 1953 to digital TV. The
FCC established a new over-the-air broadcast standard on December
27, 1996." Digital TV promises greater definition, better sound, and
more flexibility, plus digital over-the-air broadcast uses spectrum
more efficiently.
Any standards switch is hard. This one is complicated by the fact
that we do not have an RCA today, a vertically-integrated private en-
41 See Evan I. Schwartz, The Last Lone Inventor: A Tale of Genius, Deceit, and the Birth of
Television 1-7 (Harper Collins 2002) (discussing how the ongoing battle between independent
inventor Philo Farnsworth and RCA mogul David Sarnoff gave rise to the invention of TV).
42 See Kenneth Bilby, The General: David Sarnoff and the Rise of the Communications In-
dustry 124-26 (Harper & Row 1986) (describing Sarnoffs "total system approach," which paved
the way for RCA's success by providing the company with "unity of purpose and congruence of
motivation").
43 See id at 193-94 (describing how the banning of color phosphors for use in television
sets during the Korean War hurt CBS but not RCA because of the different technologies em-
ployed by the two companies).
44 In the Matter of Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Broad-
cast Service, 11 FCC Rcd 17771, 17772 (1996) ("By providing a requisite level of certainty to
broadcasters, equipment manufacturers and consumers, the benefits of digital broadcasting will
be realized more rapidly.").
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tity that can benefit across the platform -hardware and content-
from the switch (Sony might be the best match, but seems to play no
special role in this standards switch)."5 The presence of cable and satel-
lite TV further complicates matters. It is not merely a question of
synching digital broadcasts with digital tuners-though this is hard
and controversial enough6-but also getting the digital content into
the pipes-whether coaxial cable or beams from satellites-that actu-
ally deliver TV content to most viewers. Cable and satellite TV were
not a bottleneck in the prior TV standard settings.
Were these problems not enough, we finally get to the "broadcast
flag." Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony recognized that in the future,
a copyright owner's consent to home-taping might be embedded in
the broadcast signal. The FCC has commenced a rulemaking to con-
sider precisely this question as part of the switch to digital TV, consid-
ering to what extent the FCC should embrace some sort of broadcast
flag.47 This comes on the heels of an industry process under the guise
of the Broadcast Protection Discussion Subgroup, which vetted many
of the issues relating to a broadcast flag.a If consumer electronics de-
vices were designed to recognize the consent or refusal represented
by the broadcast flag, the path started by Victor and the Motion Pic-
tures Patent Co. would be completed. Copyright owners could control
use at the end-user level and copyright would be more fully proper-
tized.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE PROPERTIZATION OF COPYRIGHT
The move towards the propertization of copyright through en-
cryption - turning copyrights into real intellectual property-is quite
controversial. The flashpoint is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), a complex statute-but which, in the simple version, places
limits on the extent to which encryption schemes can be defeated. 9
45 AOL-Time Warner is a natural second choice, but its future seems uncertain, as propos-
als float about undoing the most visible internet company/media company merger yet. See
David Shook, How to Undo AOL-Time Warner, Bus Week Online (Nov 1, 2002), online at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2002/tc2002111_9399.htm (visited Dec 2,
2002) (discussing benefits of separating AOL from Time Warner).
46 In a ruling that is sure to be challenged, the FCC has set a schedule pursuant to which
consumer electronics manufacturers must include digital tuners in a variety of devices, including
TV sets. See In the Matter of Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Con-
version to Digital Television, FCC 02-230 at 6-7 (Aug 9,2002) (adopting a plan requiring manu-
facturers to equip all new televisions with digital tuners by 2005-07 depending on screen size).
47 See In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 02-231 (Aug 9, 2002) (cited in note 11).
48 See id at $ 2 (noting that the Subgroup, composed of more than seventy representatives
of related industries, announced a consensus on the use of the broadcast flag).
49 See 17 USC §§ 1201-05 (2000) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.").
2003]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Again, as copyright holders can lock content in a way that patent
holders and trademark owners cannot, encryption propertizes copy-
right and the DMCA vindicates those locks and keys.
One of the critical battlegrounds of digital consent is the ques-
tion of the scope of rights that a consumer should have in a copy-
righted work and whether producers can set those rights through a
combination of contract and technology limits. In these settings, tech-
nology just operates as contracts with end-users that can, in the main,
be enforced. The legends used by Victor, the Motion Pictures Patent
Co., and RCA can be implemented through technology. No now
means no.
What of course is driving this is that the technology of consent
has changed and this now makes richer licensing structures possible,
thereby allowing greater product diversity (meaning more licensing
options here). If copyrighted works-primarily music and video-are
delivered over the internet, the use rights can be quite tailored. The
changing technology of consent makes it possible to unbundle the
rights heretofore associated with the grant of access to a copyrighted
work.
The criticism of the propertization of copyright through encryp-
tion is both doctrinal and more theoretical. At the level of doctrine,
much of the discussion focuses on copyright's idea of fair use. s A
critical question here-if not the critical question-is the interaction
between copyright and contract. If I as a copyright holder attempt
through contract to specify a set of use rights that would be more re-
stricted than those that a user would otherwise have under fair use, is
that contract enforceable as written or is it void against public policy?
More simply, are fair use rights waivable or non-waivable? A detailed
doctrinal discussion is outside the scope of this Essay, so I will leave
that for another day.
I will focus instead on the theoretical criticism and pursue two
angles on this. The first is to consider whether certain use access
forms-rental and ownership, for example-that arose in one particu-
lar technological context should have any special status when the
technology context changes completely. The second is to focus on the
consequences of insisting that consumers must receive a mandatory
"bundle" of fair use rights that cannot be altered through contract or
technology.
On the first, I find it difficult to understand why we should privi-
lege a set of packages of use rights that arose in a different transac-
tion costs and technological setting. To date, we have lived with two
main modes of access-(1) per use typically through rental and
50 See 17 USC § 107 (2000).
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(2) full, unvarnished ownership. There certainly is an undercurrent
suggesting that any attempt to package use rights in a way that devi-
ates from those modes is necessarily out of bounds." So if a content
owner sells you a music CD but limits your ability to play it to just
music CD players and bars play on computer CD player or space-
shifting to an MP3 player, this restriction-be it through contract or
through technology-is somehow illegitimate.
This is difficult to understand. The narrow set of institutional ar-
rangements for access to content that have been supported to date re-
flect the transaction costs and technological difficulties of implement-
ing alternative arrangements. As technology changes and the transac-
tion costs of creating richer access rights drops, we should expect to
see many new institutional arrangements.
One key conception of fair use looks to transaction costs. 2 This
conception of fair use means fair use rights should change with the
times, that fair use rights depend on the technological and institu-
tional context in which transactions take place. As transaction costs
drop through a combination of institutional arrangements such as the
Copyright Clearance Center, and as the internet creates a ubiquitous
structure for micro-transactions--microconsents with micropay-
ments-fair use might cease to play a meaningful role. Note that this
means that we would not end up with "underutilized" copyrighted
works. Microconsent, as it were, would make it possible to charge us-
ers small amounts for small uses, and we could march down the de-
mand curve for a particular work.3 The dropping cost of consent
means that we can more fully exploit--through contract--the value of
a particular work. As many, if not most, copyrighted works are public
goods, we want to maximize use of the works, assuming that we can
preserve the incentives to create the work in the first place. Microcon-
sent does exactly that, while probably enhancing ex ante incentives
for creation.
A second perspective on fair use is less concerned with the trans-
action costs of consent to use and more focused on the allocative
choices that we appear to make when we allow producers to hand out
51 See, for example, DigitalConsumer.org, Bill of Rights, online at http://
www.digitalconsumer.org/bill.html (visited Dec 2, 2002) (listing legal rights of technology users,
such as the right to time-shift).
52 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 1605 (1982) (arguing that fair
use "should be interpreted as a mode of judicial response to market failure in the copyright con-
text").
53 For a more detailed description of this idea, see Stan Liebowitz, Policing Pirates in the
Networked Age, 438 Pol Anal 17-18 (Cato Institute 2002) ("The more successfully and com-
pletely a seller can match prices to the maximum prices consumers are willing to pay, the closer
the total output will be to the ideal (competitive) level.").
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narrow slices of permitted uses. 4 On this perspective, even if dropping
transaction costs allowed us to price discriminate perfectly and
thereby maximize the use of a copyrighted work, all of the surplus
from the work would be allocated to the producer. If your allocative
tastes run differently, then you might favor a set of non-waivable fair
use rights, and hope that any diminution in returns to producers
doesn't reduce the incentive to produce creative works in the first
place.
Even this turns out to be tricky to make work. If a music CD
must come with the right to make an MP3 copy, producers may just
raise the price for the bundle, and this may squeeze out some con-
sumers.5 Moreover, this approach to fair use limits product diversity.
Each consumer has to be sold the same bundle of attributes, regard-
less of whether a particular consumer wants to be able to move songs
to an MP3 player. In many ways, a mandatory fair use bundle runs
contrary to the history of blanket licenses in ASCAP and BMI, where
each has offered a blanket license giving full access to the ASCAP or
BMI library and where rights users have sought a richer set of licenses
allowing for more piecemeal use.
The other issue of interest here is the question of whether the
propertization of copyright will induce greater creativity by allowing
producers to capture a greater return on their works. While the tech-
nology of consent has changed dramatically as we have moved from
Edison's phonograph to the broadcast flag of digital TV, we probably
have not moved forward substantially on this key question. In 1940,
Judge Learned Hand offered this perspective in considering RCA's
effort to limit the radio use of records:
If the talents of conductors of orchestras are denied that com-
pensation which is necessary to evoke their efforts because they
get too little for phonographic records, we have no means of
knowing it ... ; and it is idle to invoke the deus ex machina of a
"progress" which is probably spurious, and would not be for us to
realize, if it were genuine. 7
54 See, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Ortho-
doxy of "Rights Management," 97 Mich L Rev 462, 560 (1998) (arguing that to determine
whether a digital copyright management system would benefit society, we need to consider the
purposes served by a system of rights in digital works "and the extent to which author/owner
control furthers or disserves those purposes").
55 See Liebowitz, 438 Pol Anal at 4-6 (cited in note 53) (noting that copyright holders
might be able to capture the costs of illegal copying by charging a higher price).
56 See Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting, Inc, 441 US 1, 18 (1979) ("CBS
would prefer that ASCAP be authorized, indeed directed, to make all its compositions available
at standard per-use rates within negotiated categories of use.").
57 RCA Manufacturing, 114 F2d at 90.
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